The Extended Mind and Chimpanzee Consciousness: An Exploration of the Implications of Viewing the Mind as Socially Extendable

Abstract

In 2013, philosopher Shaun Gallagher presented a new interpretation of Clark and Chalmer’s extended mind theory. He proposed that our cognition can extend not only to physical objects but to social institutions as well. This understanding of our mind rests upon the interpretation that we as conscious beings have a mind that is able to extend in a way that is observable through our behaviour. In this paper, I apply Gallagher’s socially extended mind theory to chimpanzees to argue that if we accept this theory as true, then we must also accept it as true that chimpanzees are conscious. My argument builds upon instances where chimpanzee behaviour parallels human behaviour in a way that the behaviour can be interpreted as arising from a socially extended mind and thus a consciousness. I especially highlight the role of the stable social hierarchy that exists within a chimpanzee colony, and how that influences the behaviour and cognition of the chimps. I conclude the paper by arguing that research into ape consciousness so far has been too human-focused, to a point that we have forgotten what it is like to be a chimpanzee. We should instead listen to Nagel and try to take up the animals’ point of view and be more open to the existence of other kinds of consciousness outside of our own.