A Semiospheric Interpretation of Pragmatic Difficulties in Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC)

Abstract

In recent years, the neurodiversity concept and its coherence with contemporary theories on brain function have reframed perspectives on pragmatic difficulties in Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC), consequently acknowledging the intersubjective space as a prominent part of the puzzle. In order to concretize the paradigm shift, this thesis takes the subdivided definition of “high-functioning” autism as a paradigm example, reviewing old and new cognitive theories through the neurodiversity paradigm, and examining possible cognitive bases for the pragmatic difficulties which arise in cross-neurotype communication. A baseline of contemporary cognitive theory is established through the predictive-coding hypothesis, which postulates that sensory processing and meaning-making processes of the mind are conducted through cortical means of Bayesian inference. In its framework and contrasted with a neurotypical counterpart, the autistic brain is defined as developing its internal model of the world on a neurologically different foundation of sensory and predictive processing which leaves it in large degrees unable to intuitively adapt to and differentiate between subjectively important sources of stimuli in noisy environments—those self-same environments in which the neurotypical brain thrives in, by virtue of its predictive style being predicated on generalizing sensory information. This foundation is perceived through the notion of the semiosphere, which posits that these differences in mind-world relations permit different systematizations of semiotic information in the semiosphere. From this interpretation, the autistic brain is defined as immersing itself in a semiotic continuum which in large parts is not made for it, thereby being caught in a tug-of-war between constant background acts of translation and more effortful searches for relevance.